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1 Introduction
Many Internet-connected computers are infected with malicious software, or mal-
ware. Malware can harm the infected computer user directly, for example, by in-
stalling a keystroke logger to collect confidential information surreptitiously. It can
also place the machine into a botnet consisting of thousands or even millions of com-
puters that carry out attacks of the operator’s choosing, such as sending email spam
or launching denial-of-service attacks. Infected machines can also become vectors
for further malware spread, as in the case of Conficker, which initiates attacks from
infected machines to recruit new computers to the botnet [31].
In economic terms, malware imposes negative externalities by harming innocent
third parties [3]. Negative externalities are a form of market failure, which suggests
that there will be an oversupply of the resource (in this case, malware) in equilib-
rium. Policy makers are interested in correcting this market failure to reduce the
social cost of malware. Although many stakeholders could potentially help control
the spread of malware, the emerging consensus is that Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) are best positioned to intervene [27, 2, 15].
It is less clear, however, what kind of intervention is most appropriate. The pos-
sibilities range from simply notifying infected customers to actively quarantining
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2 Steven Hofmeyr et al.
them until the malware has been demonstrably removed. It is difficult to gauge the
impact of policies and ISP-level interventions until they have been tried, and it is
expensive (both financially and in terms of political capital) to adopt industry-wide
policies. Consequently, it is important to get it right the first time.
One way to address this issue is through modeling. In this paper we model poten-
tial intervention strategies for controlling malware and compare their likely impact.
We use an agent-based model called ASIM [20], which represents the Internet at
the autonomous system (AS) level, the level at which policy interventions are being
actively considered. ASIM incorporates traffic, which is key to understanding the
spread of malware, geography, which is key to investigating country-level effects,
and economics, which is is key to understanding the cost and benefits of interven-
tions.
Through a series of experiments we study several questions, reporting some find-
ings that are unsurprising and others that are counterintuitive. For example, our ex-
periments show, as we would expect, that a few of the largest ISPs acting in concert
are more effective than a randomly chosen subset of all ASes intervening unilater-
ally. However, the numbers involved are more surprising: Intervention by the top
0.2% of ASes is more effective than intervention by 30% of ASes chosen at ran-
dom. Our results also suggest that when only the largest ASes intervene, it is better
to simply filter out malicious traffic (especially transit traffic) than to attempt to
remediate end-user infections. We also explore briefly the impact of interventions
on the growth of the network, and demonstrate that policies that are beneficial in
the short term could be harmful in the long-term. For example, the collateral dam-
age caused by blacklisting malicious traffic sources promotes those ASes that profit
from receiving more malicious traffic.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We review in greater detail
the policy interventions currently under consideration worldwide in Section 2. In
Section 3, we explain how ASIM works and how the cybersecurity interventions are
implemented. In Section 4 we describe how we empirically validated ASIM, and
Section 5 reports experimental results. We discuss related work in Section 6 and the
findings and limitations in Section 7. Finally, we conclude in Section 8.
2 Policy Interventions
There are several reasons why ISPs are a promising point of intervention. First, ISPs
are the gatekeeper to the Internet for many computers and thus in a unique position
to inspect traffic to and from their customers. Infections are often detected remotely
by scanning for outgoing connections to known command-and-control servers used
by botnet operators [24]. In this scenario, only the ISP can link an IP address to
customer details, a crucial step if customers are to be notified and assisted.
A second reason is that ample opportunity exists for reducing the prevalence of
malware by enlisting the help of ISPs. Using several years’ worth of data on com-
puters sending spam (a natural proxy for botnet activity), van Eeten et al. [15] found
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that most compromised computers were customers of legitimate ISPs, and that in-
fection rates vary dramatically across ISPs and countries. Their evidence suggests
that differences in security countermeasures, not merely target selection by attack-
ers, can affect infection rates at ISPs.
However, incentives for ISPs to implement security countermeasures are weak.
As mentioned above, much of the harm caused by malware is externalized, but the
cost of intervention would fall largely on the ISP. Although the infected host is
often unharmed by malware, the ISP is definitely not directly harmed. However, the
cost of notification and cleanup can be substantial. According to an OECD study,
one medium-sized ISP reported that it spent 1–2 % of its total revenue handling
security-related support calls [14]. Thus, there is a strong disincentive for ISPs to
notify infected customers and also pay for any resulting support calls.
Despite weak incentives, ISPs in many countries have begun exploring a vari-
ety of remedial interventions, either with government cooperation or to preempt
the imposition of more burdensome regulatory requirements. Interventions by ISPs
usually do not include the detection of malware, only remediation once malware is
detected. For notifications of misbehaving or compromised customers, ISPs rely on
third parties, such as the operators of email blacklists, botnet trackers, other ISPs
and security companies,
Once a threat is identified, most ISPs choose to do nothing, waiting until the
abuse team has time to act or for additional warnings about the customer to accrue.
However, some ISPs have begun to notify customers. In the US, Comcast automati-
cally notifies customers of infections with a browser pop-up that links to instructions
for removing the malware [10]. The customers are responsible for completing the
clean-up process, and it is inevitable that not all malware will be removed success-
fully even after notification. As a further step, Comcast has partnered with Symantec
to offer remediation by a skilled technician for $100. A similar approach is being
rolled out by Australian ISPs [6].
A more aggressive step is to place infected computers into “quarantine.” Once
in quarantine, users are required to download and install anti-virus software and
malware removal tools. They leave the quarantine only after the security software
is installed and the computer passes a network-based scan for malware. Quarantine
is considerably more expensive than the notification-only approaches, and the the
ISPs that use them do so only for a minority of affected customers. Recently, the
Dutch ISPs announced a signed agreement to notify and quarantine affected cus-
tomers [16].
Both ISPs and policy makers have realized that tackling widespread infection
can be made more effective if ISPs coordinate their interventions. In both the Dutch
and Australian case, many ISPs have joined together in common action, prodded by
their governments. This collective action is designed in part to allay the fear that
customers might switch providers rather than fix the underlying problem.
Some countries are weighing more active intervention. If the cost of customer
support is really the greatest impediment to ISP action, then the German govern-
ment’s decision to establish and subsidize a nationwide call center could really
help [21]. Under this plan, ISPs will identify infected customers and pass along
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the information to the call center. Clayton describes a proposal under consideration
by Luxembourg to subsidize the cost of voluntary cleanup whenever a customer has
been notified of infection [9]. Instead of such “carrot”-based incentives, “sticks”
could also be tried. Anderson et al. recommended that the European Commission
introduce fixed penalties for ISPs that do not expeditiously comply with notifica-
tions of compromised machines present on their networks [2].
Finally, policy makers could coordinate their defenses by aggregating notifica-
tions of infection. A survey of Dutch ISPs revealed that they notify or quarantine
only about 10% of infected customers [13] even though they claim to notify all cus-
tomers known to be infected. This occurs because their individual lists of infections
are incomplete. Data incompleteness is a widespread problem in information secu-
rity [26], as firms often jealously guard their incident information as trade secrets. To
combat this trend, the Australian Internet Security Initiative now aggregates data on
compromised machines into a single feed and passes it along to Australian ISPs [6].
3 Model Description
ASIM [20] is an agent-based model of Internet growth at the Autonomous System
(AS) level. ASes roughly correspond to ISPs. While there are differences between
ASes and ISPs (e.g., a single ISP can use several AS numbers), more extensive and
reliable data is available describing ASes than ISPs. This eases empirical validation
and explains why most of the literature has studied Internet topology at the AS
level. We summarize the important features of ASIM here, highlighting differences
between the original implementation and the version used in this paper.
ASIM is based on highly simplified implementations of four key features of
ASes: network structure, traffic flow, geography, and economics. These features are
sufficient to enable ASIM to generate networks with topologies, dynamics, and spa-
tial distributions similar to those of the Internet. There are conceptual similarities
between ASIM and some earlier Internet models such as HOT [8, 7], although many
of the details are different. For example, ASIM adds explicit economic considera-
tions and accounts directly for population density.
ASIM attempts to reproduce large-scale features of the AS level of the Internet
by modeling localized and well-understood network interactions. Instead of sim-
ply reproducing a macroscopic pattern using statistical fitting or phenomenological
models, ASIM specifies a set of primitive components (the agents) and interaction
rules that mimic the architecture of the real system. The model is run as a simulation,
and macroscopic behaviors (e.g., degree distribution) are observed and compared to
real-world data. The objective is to provide a parsimonious explanation of how a
system works by hypothesizing a small set of simple but relevant mechanisms.
In ASIM each AS is an economic agent, which manages traffic over a geograph-
ically extended network (referred to as a sub-network to distinguish it from the
network of ASes) and profits from the traffic that flows through its network. We
assume a network user population distributed over a two-dimensional grid of loca-
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tions. Traffic is generated between source and destination with a probability that is a
function of the population profile. The model is initialized with one agent that spans
one grid location. At each time step a new agent is added to a single location. As
time progresses, each agent may extend its sub-network to other locations, so that
the sub-networks reach a larger fraction of the population. This creates more traffic,
which generates profit, which is then reinvested into further network expansion. In
addition, agents link to each other, potentially routing traffic between sub-networks
other than their own. A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for two agents to be
connected is that they overlap in at least one location. Through positive feedback,
the network grows until it covers the entire population.
For this paper, we have reimplemented ASIM in order to make it run efficiently
in parallel.1 In the process, we have simplified the model, without reducing the
accuracy with which the model simulates AS-like networks. The major changes are
described below.
3.1 Simplifying the Original ASIM
In the original model described in Holme et al. [20], a variable number of agents
could be added every time step, sufficient to maintain the correct average degree.
In the new model, we simply add one agent per iteration, regardless. This follows
realistic observed growth curves where the number of new agents grows at an almost
perfectly linear rate. In our analysis of the real world data, we find that about 5.5
new ASes are added per day, so in our simulation, one time step is the equivalent
of approximately 4.4 hours. Each new agent is added to a single, already occupied
location2, chosen at random (weighted according to population).
Instead of a packet-switched model, we use the gravity model [19]. For the grav-
ity model, the traffic flow T between a pair of agents A and B is
T (A,B) =
pop(A)pop(B)
d(A,B)2
where, pop(A) is the population served by A, pop(X) is the population served by
B, and d(A,B) is the shortest path distance on the AS graph from A to B. Once we
have determined the flow between A and B, we propagate it across the graph on the
shortest path and every agent along that path gets its count of traffic increased ac-
cordingly. If there are multiple shortest paths, we randomly choose one. This traffic
flow computation is performed for every pair of agents.
The traffic model is run every 16 time steps, corresponding to every three days
of simulation time. Computing paths and carrying out traffic flow is expensive and
most paths do not change significantly in the short term. We find experimentally
that running the traffic model every 16 time steps provides a good balance between
1 Code available at http://ftg.lbl.gov/projects/asim.
2 Except for the very first agent, of course.
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computational overhead and maintaining accuracy. Note that there is no notion of
capacity, as there was in the original model.
There are two major differences in the modeling of geography. First, we disre-
gard geographic distance, i.e. the cost of expanding to a new location is constant,
regardless of where an agent expands to. By contrast, in the original model, the
greater the distance from an agent’s existing locations to a new location, the higher
the cost of expansion. Second, in the new ASIM, an agent expands to a randomly
chosen location, weighted by populace, regardless of how many other agents exist
at that location. This differs from the original model, where the location chosen was
the one with the highest shared3 population within reach.
The mechanism for earning revenue in the new implementation is very similar
to the original model. In the original model, an agent earns money for every packet
it transits. In the new ASIM, we do not have a packet-switched model, and so an
agent simply earns money every iteration proportional to the volume of traffic that
it transits in either direction.
It does not cost an agent to link, unlike in the original model. There are two cir-
cumstances in which new links are added. First, when a new agent is placed at a
location, it is linked to an agent that is chosen uniformly at random from those al-
ready at that location. This ensures the graph remains connected. Second, as in the
original model, a number of links is added on every iteration, sufficient to maintain
the desired average degree. In this case, when a link is added, the source is chosen
uniformly at random from all agents, and the destination is chosen by first choosing
an occupied location (weighted according to population), and then selecting uni-
formly at random one of the agents at that location. If the source does not exist at
that location, it expands to that location. This ensures that agents can only link if
they share a location, as in the original model.
3.2 Adding Cybersecurity to ASIM
We use ASIM to compare the effectiveness of different policy interventions that
counter the proliferation of malware infections. For simplicity, we assume that every
AS can implement interventions, i.e. we do not focus on ISPs alone. We define
insecurity by assigning a wickedness rate to each AS: the fraction of machines that
are infected with malware. Depending on its size, each AS has a corresponding
wickedness level: the absolute number of infected machines. Sometimes we will
simply refer to wickedness as an abbreviation of wickedness level. We define the
wickedness rate wi for each AS i according to the exponential distribution:
wi = min(−w ln(1− ri)),0.5)
3 The population of the location, divided by the number of agents with presence at that location.
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where ri is a value selected uniformly at random from the interval [0,1], and w is the
average wickedness. In Section 4 we explain why this distribution is a reasonable
match to observed empirical measurements of wickedness.
In ASIM, the wicked traffic that flows from a source AS A to a destination AS
B is directly proportional to the wickedness level at A. We define the wicked traffic
rate at B as the fraction of all traffic destined for end users at B that is wicked. Hence
we do not count transit traffic when measuring wickedness, although wicked traffic
is passed through the network. We are only interested in the impact of wicked traffic
on end users, and so are only concerned with the volume of traffic that reaches the
destination.
We model five types of interventions that can be undertaken by each AS:
1. Do nothing: This is the baseline where the AS makes no active intervention.
2. Reduce egress wickedness: This captures a range of AS interventions that re-
mediate customer infections. The percentage reduction of wicked egress traffic
depends on the aggressiveness of the intervention—automated notifications are
less successful than quarantine, etc.
3. Reduce ingress wickedness: An AS can deploy filters that drop some portion of
incoming wicked traffic. The proportion dropped depends on the effectiveness of
wicked traffic detection, the capacity of filtering on the routers, and other factors.
Ingress filtering can be applied to both end-user traffic and transit traffic.
4. Reduce egress and ingress wickedness: An AS can deploy methods 2 and 3
simultaneously.
5. Blacklist wicked traffic sources: An AS can drop all traffic originating from
known wicked sources, typically dropping all traffic that comes from another AS
that is known to have high infection rates. Hence there is collateral damage be-
cause legitimate as well as wicked traffic is dropped. We model this by having
an AS drop all traffic (both wicked and legitimate) from other ASes with suffi-
ciently high wickedness rates. We also model the notion of an AS being too big
to block, i.e. an AS will only blacklist smaller ASes because blacklisting large
ASes is expected to result in an excessive loss of legitimate traffic.
Another intervention under consideration by policy makers is increased data
sharing, where an AS learns about infections from an amalgamation of sources.
We do not treat data sharing as a separate intervention in the model; rather, we can
observe the effect of increased data sharing by increasing the effectiveness of ingress
and egress interventions.
Separately, we model which ASes choose to intervene as follows:
1. Unilateral: Some ASes choose to intervene unilaterally, and there is no coor-
dination between ASes or regulatory pressure on a particular subset of ASes to
intervene. We implement this by randomly selecting a subset of ASes to adopt
intervention strategies.
2. Large ASes act in concert: A selection of large ASes together adopt one of the
AS-level interventions. There are several variations on this:
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a. Global coordination: All the largest ASes adopt one of the AS-level interven-
tions.
b. Country-specific coordination: All of the largest ASes in one country adopt
one of the AS-level interventions. We implement this in the model by ran-
domly selecting a fraction of the largest ASes to apply interventions.
c. Small AS inclusion: Smaller ASes also adopt the interventions.
4 Validating the Model
The original ASIM [20] was validated on real world data and shown to be a close
match on a number of metrics. That work dates from 2006, so we have collected
more recent data to perform more extensive validation of the new ASIM. First, we
gathered data on the real topology of the AS graph using the standard method of
inferring links from BGP dumps, which we collected from the RouteViews4 and
RIPE5 databases. These data were used to validate ASIM on 12 different graph-
based metrics; the results are too extensive to include in this paper.6
Second, we gathered data on the distributions of locations among ASes in the real
world by matching geoip information from MaxMind7 with the IP prefixes of ASes
collected from the BGP dumps. We used this data to confirm that the characteristics
of the geographical distribution of agents in ASIM correspond closely with the real
Internet. We also used MaxMind to gather population data for cities matched to
locations inferred from the geoip data. We could thus confirm that the characteristics
of the population distribution in ASIM closely follow that in the real world.
Obtaining data to validate the cybersecurity extensions to ASIM is a more chal-
lenging task. Reliable data are difficult to find for the most important quantity: the
distribution of wickedness rates over the ASes. Perhaps the best data comes from a
study by Van Eeten et al. [13] of botnet activity at Dutch ISPs. The authors aggre-
gate data on IP addresses observed to be sending email spam, participating in the
Conficker botnet, or appearing in the logs of intrusion detection systems for sus-
pected attack behavior. They found that between 2% and 7% of the customers of the
nine largest Dutch ISPs were infected and exhibiting botnet activity.
Van Eeten et al. also collected similar data on global Internet activity, finding that
Dutch ISPs experience slightly lower than average rates, with the worst-performing
countries experiencing a rate several times higher than that of of the Dutch ISPs.
However, the authors do not report rates for other countries, because some coun-
tries make more extensive use of DHCP than the Netherlands, which could lead to
overestimates. To incorporate the potential for higher rates, for our experiments we
4 www.routeviews.org
5 www.ripe.net
6 Data and tools available at http://ftg.lbl.gov/projects/asim.
7 www.maxmind.com
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selected an average wickedness rate w = 0.1, slightly higher than the highest Dutch
ISP value.
Although we can derive the average wickedness rate from the Dutch data, we are
also interested in how wickedness is distributed across ISPs. To that end, we col-
lected per ISP data from two sources of malicious activities. First, we collected data
from maliciousnetworks.org, where academic researchers have constructed
a system that tallies the level of malicious activity at each AS [33]. They aggregate
reports of botnet, phishing and malware servers observed at each AS. Second, we
analyzed a single-day snapshot from the SANS Internet Storm Center, which pub-
lishes a list of over 1 million IP addresses exhibiting attack behavior 8. We then
determined the AS associated with each IP address in the SANS list and tallied the
total number of IP addresses observed at each AS to arrive at measures of wicked-
ness levels for the ASes. Note that in both of these cases, we can determine only
wickedness levels, not rates, because the number of customers served by each AS is
not publicized.
Figure 1 plots the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of
wickedness levels obtained from maliciousnetworks.org, the Internet Storm
Center, and ASIM. We can see that our use of an exponential distribution for the
wickedness levels in ASIM results in a simulated CCDF that falls between the two
empirical data sets. From this, we conclude that the method used in ASIM for gen-
erating wickedness rates for ASes is reasonable.
Even less data are available to evaluate the effectiveness of the different policy in-
terventions described in Section 2. To our knowledge, the only data on interventions
comes from the same Dutch study mentioned above [13]. The authors surveyed ISPs
about how often they notified or quarantined customers infected with malware, and
then compared this to their own measurements of wickedness levels. They found
that ISPs notified between 1% and 50% of infected customers, and that around 20-
25% of this number were also placed into quarantine. As a baseline, in ASIM we
assume that standard intervention reduces wicked traffic by 20%, although in Sec-
tion 5, we also explore the impact of varying the remediation efficacy. We place the
different intervention techniques on a continuum: notification is less effective than
quarantine, and both can be substantially improved by sharing notifications.
5 Experimental Results
We carried out a number of experiments to explore the impact of the various cy-
bersecurity interventions modeled in ASIM. First, in Section 5.1, we investigate the
simulation at a single point in time, and second, in Section 5.2 we study the simula-
tion as the network evolves. In both cases, we measure the impact of an intervention
as the percentage by which it reduces the wicked traffic rate (as defined in Sec-
tion 3.2) compared to when no intervention is adopted. When interventions occur,
8 http://isc.sans.edu/feeds/daily_sources
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Fig. 1 The distribution of wickedness levels generated by ASIM and in two real world data sets.
(Normalized)
they filter out 20% of wicked traffic, except for blacklisting, where all traffic from a
blacklisted AS is dropped, both legitimate and wicked. For all experiments, we used
the default parameter settings for ASIM V0.3.9
5.1 Impact at a Single Instant
For our study of the effect of interventions at a single point in time, we used ASIM
to grow a network of 10 000 ASes, and used that network as the basis for all exper-
iments. For each intervention, we started with the same 10 000 AS network, set the
parameters appropriately, and ran ASIM for a single time step. The traffic compo-
nent of ASIM always updates at the end of a run, so this yields a single update of
the traffic patterns, changed according to the intervention, and always starting from
the same state.
We used 10 000 ASes, rather than the current approximately 34 000 in the real
Internet,10 to reduce the running time of the simulation. This should have no sub-
9 av degree = 4.2, extent cost = 1.5, base income = 5, pop distr exp =
-1, wickedness = 0.1.
10 As of May 2010.
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Fig. 2 The change over time of the complementary cumulative distribution (CCDF) for the average
path length between every pair of ASes in the real Internet.
stantive impact on the experimental results because the key characteristics of the
AS-level graph do not change significantly as the network grows, either in our sim-
ulations or in reality. For example, Figure 2 shows that the distribution of average
path lengths has remained roughly unchanged over the last decade, even as the num-
ber of ASes has grown more than threefold.
We first examine how applying interventions to different ASes can affect wicked
traffic levels. Figure 3 shows how wicked traffic decreases when only the 20 largest
ASes (as measured by degree) adopt interventions, as compared to a random selec-
tion of between 10-30% of all ASes. This illustrates the case where interventions are
coordinated at the largest ISPs to a hands-off approach where ISPs decide for them-
selves whether or not to adopt countermeasures. The graph clearly demonstrates
that targeting the largest ASes is a superior strategy, given that targeting just the 20
largest ASes (0.2% of the total) reduces traffic by more than applying interventions
to even 3 000 randomly selected ASes.
It is not particularly surprising that targeting the largest ASes is the most effective
strategy, given the structure of the AS graph. In our simulations, the largest ASes
route up to six orders of magnitude more traffic than the smallest. Nonetheless, the
results reinforce the argument that remediation policies can be more successful by
focusing on a small group of the largest ASes, unless a majority of all ASes can be
persuaded to unilaterally respond.
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Fig. 3 The impact of interventions on wicked traffic rate. “20 largest” is the effect when the 20
largest ASes intervene; “random x%” is the effect when x percent of all ASes intervene.
What is more striking is the comparison between ingress and egress filtering.
Filtering ingress traffic destined for end users only (i.e. not filtering transit traffic)
is about as effective as filtering egress traffic (around 10% when the largest ASes
intervene). Ingress filtering of both end-user and transit traffic at the largest ASes,
by contrast, reduces wicked traffic by a factor of 2.7 over egress alone. This is a
more surprising finding, as it suggests that filtering incoming wicked traffic is more
effective than stopping outgoing traffic. When ASes act unilaterally, the difference
is not as large (a factor of 1.8) because the smaller ASes transit less traffic.
Most policy interventions under discussion have focused on ISPs’ remediating
customer infections, which is akin to egress filtering. While this does reduce wicked
traffic levels, our results suggest that resources might be put to better use by filtering
incoming and transit traffic for wickedness.
Figure 4 compares the decrease in wicked traffic at ASes that implement the
interventions to the reduction at ASes that do not adopt any interventions. The ben-
efits for non-intervening ASes represent a way to measure the positive externalities
of security interventions in the network. As expected, filtering egress traffic creates
substantial positive externalities, with non-intervening ASes experiencing similar
reductions in wicked traffic rates as intervening ASes. This effect holds for both the
largest ASes and a random selection of ASes. By contrast, filtering ingress traffic
has positive externalities only if wicked transit traffic is blocked. In this case, the
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Fig. 4 The impact of interventions on wicked traffic rate on those ASes that intervene, and those
that do not. “20 largest” is the effect when the 20 largest ASes intervene; “random x%” is the effect
when x percent of all ASes intervene.
greatest benefits accrue to the intervening ASes. This indicates that when filtering
ingress traffic, the incentives for adopting countermeasures are more aligned, and
there should be less fear of free-riding.
Furthermore, the positive externalities of ingress filtering (including transit traf-
fic) can vary greatly depending on which ASes intervene. The benefits to non-
intervening ASes are more than twice as large when the largest ASes intervene rather
than when ASes unilaterally intervene at random. This is because large ASes attract
more transit traffic, and so their filtering has a greater impact.
Even if having the largest ASes implement an intervention is the preferred strat-
egy for reducing wicked traffic on the Internet, it may not be possible to enlist the
support of all ASes. For example, even if all large US-based ISPs adopted ingress
and egress filtering, operators in other countries might choose not to participate. To
investigate the impact of incomplete adoption, Figure 5 explores how varying the
proportion of large ASes that participate in the intervention affects the reduction of
malicious traffic.
Although wicked traffic falls as more ASes participate, the effect is non-linear.
For example, the differences between 80% and 100% of ASes intervening are not
great (from 27% to 30% wicked traffic reduction, an 11% change), whereas the
differences between 60% and 80% are much greater (from 21% to 27%, a 29%
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Fig. 5 The effect of the intervention of a fraction of the largest ASes.
change). This suggests that country-level interventions are much more likely to be
effective if they include the majority of large ASes. For example, if the all the largest
ISPs based in the US were to intervene, that would constitute at least 75% of all large
ASes.
In all the experiments reported previously, the ingress and egress filtering effec-
tiveness was set at 20%. However, some interventions are likely to be more effective
than others. Notification-based schemes will filter less egress wicked traffic than
active quarantine, and increased data sharing could raise the success rate of both
ingress and egress filtering. It is very difficult to get reliable information on the ef-
ficacy of these different approaches. Instead, in Figure 6 we explore how different
combinations of values for the success rates of ingress and egress filtering affect the
wicked traffic rates. Ingress filtering is consistently more effective at reducing over-
all wickedness. For instance, ingress filtering 35% of wicked traffic and no egress
traffic reduces the wicked traffic rate by the same amount as 20% ingress and 40%
egress filtering.
We also study the more aggressive intervention of completely blocking all traf-
fic originating from blacklisted ASes with unacceptably high wicked traffic rates.
Blacklisting results in a trade-off between reducing wicked traffic and collateral
damage caused by blocking innocent traffic. We consider only the case where inter-
ventions are carried out by the 20 largest ASes (those of degree ≥ 170), because,
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Fig. 6 The change in wicked traffic rate when varying the success rate of ingress and egress filter-
ing. The scale indicates on the right the reduction in wicked traffic, from 0 to 40%.
as seen previously, interventions are most successful when the largest ASes act in
concert.
There are two choices to make when applying blacklisting: first, the selection of
the level of wickedness above which ASes are blacklisted, and second, the selection
of whether to not blacklist larger ASes. We explore three levels of AS size: black-
listing all ASes above the wickedness level, or those of degree < 170, or those of
degree < 10. For each choice of AS size, we select levels of wickedness that result
in losses of legitimate (good) traffic of 2%, 5%, 10% and 15%.
Figure 7 shows that the best strategy when applying blacklisting depends very
much on the level of legitimate traffic loss we are willing to tolerate. For very low
losses (2%) the strategies have similar results. For more moderate losses (5%), we
should blacklist all but the 20 largest ASes. Beyond that, it is more effective to
blacklist all ASes. However, we see diminishing returns as the level of acceptable
loss increases. For example, when blacklisting all ASes, a 50% increase in accept-
able loss, from 10% to 15%, only reduces the wicked traffic by an additional 23%.
In fact, increasing the level of acceptable loss does not always reduce wicked
traffic. As can be seen in Figure 8, the largest reduction of wicked traffic happens
around a wickedness level of 0.08. Furthermore, there is a range over which the
wicked traffic reduction changes little; thus, the best choice of wickedness level
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Fig. 7 The trade-off between reducing wicked traffic and losing legitimate traffic when blacklist-
ing.
would probably be around 0.12 for this example; anything lower increases the loss
of legitimate traffic with no beneficial wicked traffic reduction.
5.2 Impact on Network Growth
The effect of malicious activity on the growth of the AS network is a complex issue,
one that we do not have the space to investigate in depth in this paper. As an illus-
tration of some of the potential for modeling chronic attacks in ASIM, we briefly
consider how the cost of intervention influences network growth. Blacklisting is the
simplest intervention to incorporate into the economics of ASIM, because ASes earn
money according to how much traffic they route. Blacklisting reduces the amount
of traffic (both legitimate and wicked) seen by ASes and hence should change the
evolution of the network.
We carried out experiments where the 20 largest ASes intervene to blacklist all
traffic originating from ASes of degree less than 170. We set the wickedness level
for blacklisting to be 0.18, which results in moderate legitimate traffic loss. At this
level, according to Figure 7, the best strategy is to blacklist all sufficiently wicked
ASes of degree less than 170.
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Fig. 8 The reduction in wicked traffic and the loss of legitimate (good) traffic when blacklisting
all ASes of degree < 170.
Figure 9 shows how wicked traffic and lost legitimate traffic change as the net-
work evolves from 5 000 to 13 000 ASes. The wicked traffic increases slightly (by
about 9%) and the lost legitimate traffic decreases significantly (by about 66%). To
understand why this happens, consider two classes of ASes: those that lose incom-
ing traffic due to blacklisting (class A) and those that do not (class B). In ASIM,
every AS depends on traffic for revenue, and so ASes in class A will earn less and
hence grow more slowly than ASes in class B. The ASes in class A will have re-
duced levels of wicked traffic and increased levels of lost legitimate traffic compared
to those in class B. Thus, as ASes in class B grow more than those in class A, the
overall level of wicked traffic will increase, and the overall level of legitimate traffic
lost will decrease. This is exactly what we see in Figure 9.
Although blacklisting tends to promote ASes that receive more wicked traffic,
the rate at which wicked traffic increases is much slower than the rate at which lost
legitimate traffic decreases. Hence, blacklisting could still be considered a viable
strategy for reducing overall wickedness, at least in the short term. Persuading indi-
vidual ASes to voluntarily adopt blacklisting, however, would be hard. Mandatory
participation would likely be necessary.
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Fig. 9 The change in wicked traffic and loss of legitimate traffic over time as the network grows
from 5 000 to 13 000 ASes. The wicked traffic rate is the percentage of all traffic that is wicked.
6 Related Work
Few studies have modeled the costs and benefits of intervention to prevent the spread
of malware across a network. LeLarge [22, 23] used an agent-based model to inves-
tigate the economics of interventions that counter the spread of malware. However,
LeLarge’s model is much more abstract than ASIM: agents exist on a random net-
work, over which there is a probabilistic spread of infections. Agents can choose
either to secure themselves (at a cost) or to remain unsecured and risk loss. There
is no notion of geography or traffic. Varian [34] proposed a game-theoretic model
to understand how security impacts the decisions of other rational actors, but with-
out considering network topology or how infections may spread. Subsequently, a
number of authors [29, 5] have proposed models of computer-infection spread that
combine game theory with network topology. These models focus on optimal strate-
gies to combat a binary state of infection.
By contrast, a number of models have been developed to explore the spread
of malware, such as computer worms [17]. Compartmental models of disease
spread (whether biological or electronic) are attractive methods for investigating the
progress of epidemics [4]. For example, Ajelli et al. describe the spread of a botnet
using such a model [1]. Other work incorporates additional factors into differential
equation models, such as locations based on time zone [12] and peer-to-peer proto-
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cols [32]. These approaches focus on the spread of a single type of malware, such
as a particular worm or botnet. By contrast, our approach is to model all malware
in a generic way, incorporating both the economics of interventions, and the way
interventions affect the spread of malicious traffic on the Internet topology at the
AS level.
A major difference between agent-based models, such as ASIM, and differen-
tial equation models, such as those described above, is that the latter assume that
populations are ‘well-mixed’; consequently they do not capture the effect of skewed
network topologies. Various extensions, such as percolation methods and generat-
ing functions [28], have been proposed as a method for overcoming this limitation,
spawning a great deal of interest in epidemics on network topologies [18]. Other
extensions include using packet-level data generated by computer network traffic
simulators [35]. In addition to investigating the spread of malware across network
topologies, mitigation strategies such as quarantining malicious hosts [25, 30, 11]
have been investigated. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies
that use these models to investigate intervention policies at the ISP or Internet-level.
7 Discussion
ASIM simplifies many aspects of routing on the real Internet. For example, traffic
in ASIM always follows the shortest path, whereas real traffic is also influenced by
agreements between ASes, following various conventions such as the “valley free”
rule. In ASIM ASes earn money from all traffic they route, whereas in reality ASes
earn money from their customers and pay their own upstream providers. But we
found in preliminary investigations that these added complexities do not improve
the accuracy of the model, at least in terms of measures such as average path length,
degree distribution, etc. More detailed modeling is a topic for future research and
may lead to have implications for the study of policy interventions.
Other model enhancements would allow us to study more carefully the impact
of interventions on the economics of network growth. We have presented a simple
initial approach, using blacklisting, but in future we intend to explore other aspects,
such as the cost of carrying out various interventions. Blacklisting is simple in that
packets from a particular source are dropped, whereas filtering only wicked traffic
would likely be much more expensive, requiring a sophisticated intrusion detection
system (IDS). Because of the performance requirements, it may be infeasible to filter
traffic using an IDS at the level of the powerful routers used in the largest ASes. In
this case, blacklisting and improving end-user security may be the only reasonable
options.
In our experiments with network growth, we kept the level of wickedness, or
compromised hosts, constant. This is clearly unrealistic as the number of compro-
mised hosts changes over time as some are cleaned up and others infected. Further-
more, we expect that the amount of wicked traffic reaching end-users will also influ-
ence infection rates. It is difficult to find good data on how these rates change over
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time, and so it will be difficult to validate a model that captures these aspects. One
topic for future research is to model dynamic wickedness levels, perhaps following
an epidemiological model where there is some rate of recovery from infection, and
some rate of reinfection, which is to some degree dependent on wicked traffic flow.
8 Conclusions
The results of our experiments using ASIM indicate that when filtering wicked traf-
fic, the best targets for intervention are a small group of the largest ASes. Specifi-
cally, we find that intervention by the top 0.2% of ASes (in terms of size) is more
effective than intervention by a randomly chosen subset of 30% of all ASes. How-
ever, we show that this efficacy rapidly drops off if less than three quarters of that
top 0.2% intervene. This is an issue of importance if not all the largest ASes fall
within the same regulatory domain, such as a nation-state.
Our experiments also illustrate the relative effectiveness of filtering ingress and
egress traffic. We show that filtering ingress traffic (including transit) is more than
twice as effective as filtering egress traffic alone. Unsurprisingly, the effect of fil-
tering is felt most strongly by those actively filtering the data, although positive
externalities can be seen if outgoing or transit traffic is filtered. In our model, filter-
ing egress traffic is also a proxy for end-user remediation, which suggests that the
current focus on cleaning up ISP customers is not the most effective strategy.
In the case of blacklisting, we show that the choice of which ASes should be
exempt from blacklisting depends on how much legitimate traffic loss we are will-
ing to tolerate. If moderate levels of legitimate traffic loss are acceptable, then large
ASes should be exempt; however, if higher levels of traffic loss are acceptable all
ASes should be eligible for blacklisting. The threshold for which ASes are black-
listed does not relate linearly to the reduction in the wicked traffic rate. This is likely
due to attrition of good traffic, raising the fraction of wicked traffic seen.
Our investigations of the impact of interventions on the evolution of the network
are brief and are limited to modeling the effect of blacklisting traffic on growth.
We show that blacklisting traffic results in a gradual increase in wicked traffic, and
a more rapid reduction in the loss of legitimate traffic. Although this is beneficial
in the short term, in the long-term those ASes that profit most from wicked traffic
will prosper at the expense of more secure ASes, and so global effectiveness will
decline.
We believe that the results reported in this paper are a good proof-of-concept
demonstration of how agent-based modeling can be useful to policy makers when
considering different interventions. We hope in future that our approach will provide
additional interesting results and tools to help policy makers determine the best way
to respond to the growing malware threat.
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